Undernutrition is the single largest contributor to the global burden of disease and can be addressed through a number of highly efficacious interventions. Undernutrition generally has not received commensurate attention in policy agendas at global and national levels, however, and implementing these efficacious interventions at a national scale has proven difficult. This paper reports on the findings from studies in Bangladesh, Bolivia, Guatemala, Peru and Vietnam which sought to identify the challenges in the policy process and ways to overcome them, notably with respect to commitment, agenda setting, policy formulation and implementation. Data were collected through participant observation, documents and interviews. Data collection, analysis and synthesis were guided by published conceptual frameworks for understanding malnutrition, commitment, agenda setting and implementation capacities. The experiences in these countries provide several insights for future efforts: (a) high-level political attention to nutrition can be generated in a number of ways, but the generation of political commitment and system commitment requires sustained efforts from policy entrepreneurs and champions; (b) mid-level actors from ministries and external partners had great difficulty translating political windows of opportunity for nutrition into concrete operational plans, due to capacity constraints, differing professional views of undernutrition and disagreements over interventions, ownership, roles and responsibilities; and (c) the pace and quality of implementation was severely constrained in most cases by weaknesses in human and organizational capacities from national to frontline levels. These findings deepen our understanding of the factors that can influence commitment, agenda setting, policy formulation and implementation. They also confirm and extend upon the growing recognition that the heavy investment to identify efficacious nutrition interventions is unlikely to reduce the burden of undernutrition unless or until these systemic capacity constraints are addressed, with an emphasis initially on strategic and management capacities.
Introduction
Undernutrition is the single largest contributor to the global burden of disease, accounting for 10% of disability-adjusted life-years lost in the general population and 35% among children under 5 years of age . This is roughly two to four times greater than the global, general-population (i.e. all-ages) burden due to pneumonia (5.6%), HIV/AIDS (4.7%), diarrhoea (3.9%), malaria (2.6%) and tuberculosis (2.3%) (Lopez et al. 2006) . In addition, undernutrition has documented effects on cognitive development, educational outcomes, work capacity and gross domestic product (World Bank 2006) . The full implementation of proven, direct interventions could reduce the mortality and disability due to undernutrition by about 25% . Despite this knowledge, progress in reducing undernutrition and improving the coverage of key interventions remains low (Bryce et al. 2008; UNICEF 2008) , and financing from the international community is not on par with that seen for other global health problems (World Bank 2006; Morris et al. 2008 ).
In reviewing country-level efforts to reduce undernutrition, the Lancet Nutrition Series identified several key challenges: building and maintaining priority for nutrition, choosing context-appropriate actions and implementing them at scale, reaching those most in need, making data-based decisions, and building strategic and operational capacity (Bryce et al. 2008) . The series suggested that a large reservoir of experience and expertise exists at country level for addressing these socio-political and operational challenges, and urged that greater efforts be made to gather these experiences, formalize the knowledge base, and facilitate the exchange of experience across countries. These recommendations were considered especially important because of the documented imbalances in current health and nutrition research agendas. Those agendas have emphasized the development and testing of new technologies and interventions (Leroy et al. 2007) , or the problems of greatest concern to researchers and funding agencies in developed countries (Morris et al. 2008) , rather than the more complex and practical challenges facing policy makers and implementers in developing countries (Rudan et al. 2007a; Rudan et al. 2007b) .
There currently are several major initiatives being planned or underway related to nutrition, including the global Scaling Up Nutrition initiative and a number of bilateral and private efforts (Bezanson and Isenman 2010) . These investments are unprecedented in terms of their scale and potential impact on nutrition and most of them signal intent to foster country ownership and broad stakeholder engagement in policy development and implementation. The present paper is highly relevant to these efforts. It examines the experiences from five developing countries in relation to three basic issues: agenda setting, formulating programmes and policies, and implementing programmes and policies. In keeping with an emergent form of policy research described in recent publications (Buse 2008; Walt et al. 2008 ), this paper is based on a prospective and engaged research in which external researchers acted as participant-observers in selected countries, providing selective technical assistance to the nutrition effort while simultaneously observing and learning from the country's experiences.
The Mainstreaming Nutrition Initiative
The Mainstreaming Nutrition Initiative (MNI) was a three-year project funded by the World Bank from 2006 to 2009, administered through a grant to the International Center for Diarrheal Disease Research, Bangladesh (ICDDR,B) with sub-contracts to Cornell University, the University of South Carolina, the Aga Khan University, the International Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI) and other collaborating institutions. A major aim of MNI was to acquire a base of experience at country level for moving nutrition more into the mainstream of national policies and programmes, especially in the health sector. This paper presents the main findings from MNI's country-level activities.
MNI engaged with selected countries based on a combination of country characteristics and partnership opportunities in addition to the high prevalence of undernutrition in each country (Table 1) . Bolivia, Peru and Guatemala were chosen because in each the head of state had made some commitments to address nutrition, thereby offering the opportunity to document the commitment-building processes and the factors that may enable or inhibit the subsequent processes of policy formulation and implementation. Bangladesh was chosen because the leadership of BRAC, a major implementer of health programmes in the country, had expressed interest in integrating nutrition into its maternal and child health programmes, again offering the opportunity to learn about the integration process by engaging in the effort. Later, MNI staff in Bangladesh also played key roles in placing anaemia on the national agenda. In Vietnam, by contrast, there was no prior expression of strong interest in nutrition at the senior administrative level, but the potential of collaborating with several interested international organizations and the National Institute of Nutrition offered the opportunity to study the agenda-setting process in a prospective fashion. As shown in Table 1 , the varied needs and circumstances in each country created diversity in the MNI partnerships, roles, activities, levels and forms of engagement, and, thus, in the particular features of the policy process most amenable for study.
The research process
The policy process making is a complex and dynamic process (Buse 2008; Walt et al. 2008) . As noted in recent papers, efforts to study the policy process in a prospective and engaged fashion are fraught with theoretical, practical, political, ethical and methodological challenges, and these papers note that the research community is only now beginning to address these challenges (Buse 2008; Walt et al. 2008) . MNI encountered many if not all of these challenges, and our management of them is briefly summarized here.
Emergent research questions and guiding frameworks
Two of the distinguishing features of this study are the use of an engaged and prospective research design and the use of several explicit conceptual frameworks to guide our efforts. From the outset, MNI staff were committed to engaging with our in-country partners first as consultants, advisors and/or collaborative problem-solvers, rather than researchers, thereby allowing the most salient research questions to emerge in the process and to understand the context, actors and interests in greater detail. We used several general frameworks to guide our inputs into the evolving policy process and to analyse and organize our observations. These included Shiffman's frameworks for agenda setting (Shiffman 2007; Shiffman and Smith 2007) and the policy sciences framework (Clark 2002) to help us attend to the full spectrum of activities in the policy process. The latter includes agenda setting (generating policy attention to an issue), policy formulation (deciding interventions and implementation strategies), legitimation (generating authoritative endorsement for the interventions and strategies), implementation (translating policy intent into effective inputs, activities and services for the population) and monitoring and evaluation (tracking progress and making adjustments).
Positionality, data sources and inferences
As noted in Table 1 , MNI staff varied widely across the five countries in terms of identity, role, partnerships and relationships (i.e. positionality, as discussed in Walt et al. 2008) . These factors can influence the positions and strategies we employed to affect the policy process as well as our ability to observe, comprehend and draw conclusions about the process. To reduce the risk of drawing self-serving conclusions related to our own 
Presentation of findings
Findings and interpretations are organized according to frameworks and indicators that have proved useful in earlier work. Specifically, for describing commitment we adapted a set of indicators developed by Heaver (2005) . Heaver defines commitment as 'the will to act and keep on acting until the job is done' and he applies it to all actors in a system, not only those at the top. We adapted Shiffman's frameworks as an initial basis for understanding the progress in agenda setting within and across countries (Shiffman 2007; Shiffman and Smith 2007) . Finally, we drew upon Shiffman's work as well as other literature to understand the difficulties experienced by the mid-level actors in these countries in taking advantage of the political openings to formulate concrete policies and operational strategies to reduce undernutrition.
Results
Levels and forms of commitment Table 2 presents the indicators of commitment in the five countries based on Heaver's framework (Heaver 2005) . The most consistent indicators of commitment are related to the emphasis on undernutrition in high-level speeches, and the establishment of laws, decrees, national strategy papers or institutional structures. These indicators are present to varying degrees in all countries. Some indicators are seen in two countries each: mobilization of political attention at sub-national levels (Bolivia, Peru), creating a video or television spots (Peru, Vietnam), establishing quantitative targets (Peru, Guatemala), and creation or utilization of a full-time secretariat or technical team (Bolivia, Guatemala), an existing institution (National Institute of Nutrition in Vietnam) or hiring of a staff member dedicated to nutrition (Bangladesh/BRAC, not shown). The indicators most rarely observed are the development of concrete operational plans, translation of plans into budgets, allocation of budgets commensurate with the size of the problem, implementation of actions, and active oversight by politicians or senior officials with the authority to take action.
Although these data represent a 'point in time' assessment of an on-going process in each of these countries, an understanding of the contextual factors in each country helps explain these results. In Bolivia, Peru and Guatemala the largely symbolic actions taken by the heads of state (speeches, targets, coordinating structures) brought political benefits because they resonated with the political discourse during electoral campaigns on the social conditions in the country (i.e. poverty, social exclusion, gross inequity). These symbolic actions entailed little or no political cost because, in the absence of sustained pressure from civil society in any of these three countries, there was limited accountability for producing nutrition results. In addition, in all three countries there were more pressing national issues that overtook nutrition in the symbolic agenda after the elections.
In Vietnam and Bangladesh, there were no comparable efforts from advocates or policy entrepreneurs to create political attention to nutrition during elections, such that the symbolic actions noted above are not as pronounced in these two countries. Instead, as revealed in all the other indicators in Table 2 , a variety of actions were taken by ministry officials, donors or non-governmental organization (NGO) actors. These actions reflect the interests, entrepreneurial activity, capacity and bureaucratic politics of and among these actors. Thus, public campaigns and sub-national awareness-raising activities were instigated by these actors, and the Ministry of Health (MOH) and its partners were able to take more initiative than the other sectors. Meanwhile, efforts to develop operational plans, budgets and effective coordination across sectors encountered political and bureaucratic difficulties in all countries that have attempted it so far. In principle, these difficulties could have been resolved with greater oversight and intervention by politicians, but such actions did not occur and likely would have incurred higher political costs.
This 'snapshot' view provided in Table 2 suggests that commitment can be quite 'patchy', when viewed from a system-wide perspective. Important distinctions exist between the political versus the bureaucratic sphere, the MOH versus other sectors, electoral versus non-electoral contexts, and actions with high versus low political costs. In an overall sense, the results suggest a major distinction should be made between the generation of political attention (via the political or symbolic agenda) versus the translation of that attention into effective action (policy formulation and implementation). The first does not necessarily lead to the second. The dynamics underlying each of these is examined in greater detail in the following sections. Table 3 summarizes findings concerning the influence of several agenda-setting factors on political attention, using indicators developed by others (Shiffman 2007; Shiffman and Smith 2007) . Of the 12 factors in this table, only the existence of credible indicators of the problem (stunting in four countries and anaemia in Bangladesh) was found to be a crucial factor in all countries. In four countries the important factors were promotion of external norms (e.g. regarding stunting and anaemia); the promotion of a salient external frame (e.g. the 'stalled progress' in reducing stunting in Peru and Bolivia, and very high anaemia rates in Bangladesh); the ability to form and maintain advocacy cohesion within the core policy community (e.g. the coalition of NGOs and United Nations agencies in Peru); and the ability to overcome or re-frame competing policy priorities (e.g. framing in relation to poverty, food insecurity and a right to food in Guatemala). The remaining indicators are more uneven in their distribution across countries, but notable As used here, the term political attention is a more limited concept than commitment or political priority as used elsewhere (Heaver 2005; Shiffman 2007) . It refers to the expression of concern about the problem by high-level politicians and varying degrees of enabling actions taken to allow or encourage the government to address malnutrition. However, it does not include the most critical elements of commitment such as regular oversight, establishing accountability for progress and allocating the necessary human, financial and organizational resources.
Agenda-setting factors
for their lack of salience for political agenda-setting in most of the countries are external resource provision and civil society mobilization. The findings for Bolivia, Peru and Guatemala versus Vietnam and Bangladesh were examined in greater detail in light of the distinctions noted in the previous section between the political and bureaucratic sphere, electoral versus non-electoral contexts, and MOH versus multisectoral settings. This distinction reveals different dynamics in the two sets of countries. In Bolivia, Peru and Guatemala, political transitions, credible indicators and an effective external frame all were universally crucial, while norm promotion, resource provision, civil society mobilization, appearance of clear solutions and the existence of competing policy priorities were not. This reflects that fact that the advocacy messages to politicians were aimed at documenting the existence of a problem and connecting it to broader political themes (poverty, inequity, etc.) without the need to offer clear solutions, appeal to international norms, or make use of (or create) focusing events. This advocacy was undertaken by different constellations of actors in each case (described in row 6, Table 3 ) and led to high-level political attention in each case, but only required a general level of internal consensus among a restricted number of advocates. There was little or no involvement of the many other mid-level actors that later would become involved in policy formulation, which may be one of the reasons for the difficulties experienced at that later stage.
In Vietnam and Bangladesh, by contrast, the strategizing took place among mid-level actors for the purpose of advocating to higher levels within the MOH, for a national stunting reduction strategy in Vietnam and a national anaemia control strategy in Bangladesh. As a result, a cohesive internal advocacy frame was developed, and there was greater use of focusing events (international conferences hosted in Vietnam), credible indicators and international norms. In these two countries, the appearance of clear solutions also was important either from the outset or soon after the issue moved into a discussion of solutions. These differing dynamics in the two sets of countries were successful in generating either political or high-level bureaucratic attention for the nutrition issue.
Policy formulation
In contrast to their success in generating political or bureaucratic attention to nutrition, these countries experienced difficulties in policy formulation. Policy formulation is defined here as the process of translating the political or bureaucratic openings for nutrition into concrete operational plans that include specification of interventions and technical choices, targeting, delivery mechanisms, roles and responsibilities, human and financial resources, etc. The reasons for these difficulties can be seen in Table 4 , which is based on two of Shiffman's factors. Although the specifics differ across the countries, two major findings stand out.
First, the lack of agreement within the core policy community on the choice, priority and sequencing of interventions-and on institutional roles and responsibilities-has resulted in significant delays and risked eroding sustained political interest. In Bolivia and Guatemala, there was disagreement over the role, if any, for fortified complementary foods as part of a national preventive intervention strategy. In Peru, there was disagreement over central leadership for the President's new nutrition initiative, with some actors favouring the ministry that was historically responsible for the politically popular but poorly-targeted food distribution programmes and others favouring the MOH. Policy formulation in Peru was further complicated when a major donor agency that was not part of the original advocacy coalition entered the policy dialogue at a high political level, marginalized the advocacy coalition and promoted a different intervention strategy. In all three Latin American countries, a major source of disagreement or ambiguity related to the focus on broad, multisectoral strategies (and defining the precise role of each sector) versus more narrow, often health-sector-based interventions. These examples illustrate that the disagreements often could not be resolved through appeals to technical evidence, and more often were related to questions of institutional leadership, expertise, agenda control, the promotion of contrasting intervention models by various institutions, differences in problem definition (e.g. malnutrition as a food insecurity and right-to-food issue vs. a child care and feeding issue), and differing perceptions or ideological positions regarding the feasibility and/or desirability of broad-based multisectoral approaches versus more narrow, selective interventions.
Differences and disagreements of this type are a common feature of the policy process, and can be an asset if they stimulate a more in-depth and systematic analysis and deliberation of various policy alternatives (National Research Council 1996; Hajer 2003) . This occurred in Bangladesh, in relation to the choice of interventions to control anaemia, and the tentative choice of interventions was made in light of evidence presented by ICDDR,B concerning efficacy of various interventions. The second major finding in Table 4 , however, is that there do not appear to be effective fora or institutional mechanisms for discussing, negotiating and resolving these differences in relation to multisectoral strategies. Multisectoral structures were established in Bolivia, Guatemala and Peru but, consistent with experience in earlier decades (Levinson 1995) , these were unable to resolve these differing perspectives, disagreements and ambiguities. In the absence of such mechanisms, those decisions that were taken tended to be resolved through the exercise of formal authority (e.g. key MOH decisions in Bolivia) and informal power relationships (e.g. among government actors or between government and international actors). The exercise of formal authority allowed some of the institutions, such as the MOH in Bolivia, to formulate portions of their operational plans and begin implementation, but it is still too early to assess whether these authoritative decisions were 'the correct' ones in the sense of generating reductions in malnutrition.
Policy implementation
None of the countries studied here had implemented new interventions, programmes or other actions at a national scale during our period of engagement. However, the extensive discussions and initial activities (e.g. trainings and roll-out of selected structures and activities in pilot or high priority regions or districts) do provide insight into the range of factors likely to influence the implementation process and the types of capacities required to manage them effectively.
The Potter and Brough framework provides a useful way to summarize the implementation and capacity issues observed in these countries by recognizing a four-tiered hierarchy of needs (tools; skills; staff and infrastructure; and structures, systems and roles) and nine component capacities (material supplies and resources, personal capacities, workload and supervisory capacities, facilities and support services, administrative systems, coordination and decision-making capacities, and authoritative role definition) (Potter and Brough 2004) . These four tiers and nine components are relevant at each administrative level, from national, to regional, municipal/district and local.
The strengths and weaknesses of these capacities vary widely according to sector (MOH and BRAC vs. others) and intervention type (e.g. micronutrient powders vs. growth promotion vs. food security interventions), in addition to varying across administrative levels and countries. In all five countries, the MOH (or BRAC, in the case of Bangladesh) has at least the basic staff, infrastructure, administrative systems and authority to implement selective (i.e. direct) nutrition interventions. For that reason, they have made more progress in formulating and taking some initial implementation steps in some countries, such as training, developing materials, purchasing equipment and procuring supplies. Nonetheless, implementation in these cases is hampered by a variety of systemic weaknesses, including staff and supervisory workload, remuneration and job satisfaction; mastery of tools and skills for new or strengthened interventions; limited outreach beyond health facilities; limited finances for supporting interventions at national scale; weak accountability of staff at all levels; and limited resources and attention for addressing these systemic weaknesses. This is illustrated in the case of Bolivia and Bangladesh in Box 1.
These same limitations exist outside of the health sector (e.g. agriculture, education, social welfare) but, as seen in Bolivia, Guatemala and Peru which sought multisectoral approaches, these sectors tend to be even further constrained in three ways. First, they have less developed staff and infrastructure for supporting nutrition-related interventions (e.g. limited numbers of agricultural extension workers). Second, there are weaknesses in the horizontal coordination, planning and decisionmaking structures and processes at each level (municipal, regional and national) and in the vertical coordination among these levels. Thus, the advocacy for nutrition at the municipal and regional levels (conducted by national staff) has at times been effective in raising local awareness and a desire to address malnutrition, but the staff at these decentralized levels do not possess the knowledge and skills needed to design and implement interventions in various sectors, and they had not received adequate guidance from the national level. Finally, there are severe limitations in the performance capacity and workload capacity for basic programme planning, management, monitoring and evaluation at national levels. This latter constraint is especially important because it limits the ability to anticipate, detect and address the many specific capacity constraints noted above.
Conclusions and policy implications
This paper has examined nutrition commitment, agenda setting, policy formulation and implementation based on experiences from five developing countries. The strengths of the study include the use of explicit conceptual frameworks for inquiring into various facets of these complex processes, the opportunity to study these processes in a prospective fashion and as a participant-observer, the opportunity for the research team to challenge and refine each other's emergent interpretations from each country, and the contextual diversity across the five countries. The weaknesses include the relatively limited time frame (1-2 years), the varying level of engagement in each country, and the limited capacity to inquire in greater depth into the wide range and complex nature of the issues inherent in these three aspects of the policy process. With these strengths and limitations in mind, the study has implications for the current global and national efforts to improve nutrition and future research.
Commitment
There are important distinctions to be made between political attention, political commitment and system-wide commitment. The use of a framework adapted from Heaver's work (Heaver 2005) reveals that nutrition can receive impressive political attention when high-level officials address it through speeches, executive directives, setting of targets and establishment of coordinating structures, but this appears to be insufficient. Evidence of deeper political commitment would include allocation of the necessary authority, accountability and resources to relevant ministries; and the exercise of oversight to ensure progress in developing strategies and operational plans (policy formulation). The latter appears particularly important because of the difficulties the mid-level actors experienced in policy formulation, including those in government and in the donor and NGO communities, and the many capacity gaps that will limit the reach and effectiveness of interventions. In addition, high-level political champions may be the only actors capable of generating system-wide commitment on the part of mid-level ministry officials and staff, and the managers and implementers at regional, municipal and local levels. The commitment of the managers and implementers is crucial for effective implementation, but they are unlikely to prioritize nutrition over the many other issues for which they are responsible unless they receive sustained and meaningful signals and incentives from higher levels in their organizations (as illustrated in Bangladesh, Box 1).
These distinctions among political attention, political commitment and system-wide commitment are seldom recognized in discourse or practice. The mid-level policy entrepreneurs (Kingdon 1995; Mintrom 2000) who typically are responsible for the behind-the-scenes work of advocacy and commitment building could address this issue by formulating and promoting a more comprehensive set of action steps for senior politicians and senior ministry officials, including the need to send appropriate signals and incentives to managers and implementers.
Agenda setting
The experiences related to agenda setting suggest three important conclusions:
(1) There are many potential strategies for getting nutrition onto the government's agenda (e.g. the efforts of a single trusted MOH official, a single well-connected businessman, or a coalition of international NGOs and United Nations agencies in partnership with government officials); (2) Agenda setting can be accomplished even when only a few of the 12 influential conditions are present (Shiffman 2007; Shiffman and Smith 2007) ; and (3) It does not appear necessary to identify a clear, evidence-based solution in order to get nutrition onto the agenda [contrary to the proposition in Kingdon and other models (Kingdon 1995) ].
In all four of the countries where national pronouncements were made to address chronic undernutrition (Bolivia, Guatemala, Peru and Vietnam), the most influential factors appear to have been clear evidence for the size and urgency of the problem, the framing of the problem that had political resonance, and some strategically placed and effective 'messengers'. The proposed solution in Bolivia, Guatemala and Peru (multisectoral strategies) is most notable for its resonance within the prevailing political discourse in the country rather than its appearance of feasibility or the evidence for its effectiveness. Indeed, the evidence from similar attempts in earlier periods reveals it often can be a problematic strategy (Field 1977; Levinson 1995) . This is in contrast to Bangladesh where evidence concerning the efficacy of a relatively simple intervention was crucial for sustaining interest in addressing anaemia (along with the involvement of credible national institutions and individuals). These experiences suggest that evidence concerning solutions can be of great value for setting agendas and sustaining interest, when such evidence exists, but it also is possible for issues to rise on policy agendas even in the absence of such evidence. These conclusions pertain specifically to the process of getting nutrition onto the national policy agenda, but they need to be viewed within the larger policy process. That larger process includes the building of deeper political commitment and broader system-wide commitment, formulation of specific strategies and operational plans, capacity-building initiatives and implementation of effective actions at large scale. Success in agenda setting and advocacy to senior policy makers does not guarantee success in these other aspects of the policy process. It is likely that many of the 12 factors identified by Shiffman are important for these other aspects of the policy process (Shiffman 2007; Shiffman and Smith 2007) , especially for sustaining attention and effective action over time, and therefore should be part of a longer-term strategic approach for addressing nutrition.
Policy formulation
One of the most striking observations in this study relates to the difficulties experienced by the mid-level actors in formulating and agreeing upon concrete intervention strategies, roles and responsibilities, and in developing concrete operational plans, even in those cases where a rare window of opportunity was created by the head of state. These difficulties arose, to varying degrees, due to differing professional views about the most effective or appropriate intervention strategies (e.g. whether to distribute fortified complementary food to all children 6-24 months), differing institutional positions concerning these strategies, rivalries concerning leadership or agenda control, and genuine uncertainties concerning the roles of various ministries other than the MOH. The net result has been significant delays in moving the nutrition agenda forward in most countries, and, most worrying, the risk of eroding the interest, support and confidence of the political champions and donors. These difficulties and disagreements were not as salient in the literature on multisectoral nutrition planning in the 1970s, which instead stressed the importance of political commitment and implementation capacities (Field 1977; Pines 1982; Berg 1987; Field 1987) , with one notable exception (Iverson et al. 1979) .
These difficulties and disagreements in policy formulation parallel the dynamics observed within nutrition policy communities in recent years at the global (Morris et al. 2008 ) and national levels (Pelletier 2008; Natalicchio 2009) , and in health policy and other sectors more broadly (Mills 1990; Kingdon 1995; Shiffman 2007; Shiffman and Smith 2007; Walt et al. 2008) . The appropriate response depends fundamentally on the specific source of the problem and the context. For instance, differing professional views might sometimes be addressed through various collaborative problem-solving methods (Holman 1999; Senge 2006; Innes and Booher 2010) . Genuine knowledge or evidence gaps might sometimes benefit from consulting trusted experts, seeking guidance from authoritative sources (e.g. WHO guidelines, Lancet series), and reviewing or gathering relevant evidence (Mulrow 1994; Bowen 2005) .
However, the experience in these countries and the broader literature (Wildavsky 1979; Rogers 1988; Majone 1989; Barker and Peters 1993; Rochefort and Cobb 1994; Stone 2002; Huxham 2003; Atkins 2005) suggests that differences in professional views and interpretations of knowledge or evidence typically are intertwined with professional and institutional values, incentives, agendas and rivalries, i.e. they relate to competing interests rather than purely intellectual or knowledge constraints. As such, responses that only seek to address intellectual, knowledge or evidence issues are unlikely to succeed (Black and Donald 2001; Behague et al. 2009) . Similarly, the establishment of multisectoral councils or other formal decision structures are unlikely to be sufficient by themselves, as seen in these countries and earlier experiences (Levinson 1995) . One approach for overcoming these difficulties and disagreements in the policy-formulation process is to strengthen the strategic capacity within the nutrition policy community, referring to the individual and institutional capacity to broker agreements, resolve conflicts, build relationships, respond to recurring challenges and opportunities, and undertake strategic communications (Mintrom 2000; Agranoff 2007; Pelletier 2008 issued a national directive requiring local governments to initiate the intervention, secured national hydrocarbon tax (IDH) funds municipalities could use to pay for the initiative, developed a micronutrient formula for Nutribebe, certified a national firm to begin producing the product, and had 66 municipalities buying and/or distributing the product (20% of all municipalities, 31% of ZM priority municipalities). Capacity constraints and concerns: Challenges that developed during implementation included: (1) limited advocacy beyond health staff to ensure that municipal officials were aware of the programme, convinced of its need and informed of procedures to allocate funds and purchase the product; (2) weak local capacity to supervise counselling for correct use and monitor children's product use (as opposed to coverage); (3) no guidance regarding how to store or distribute the product effectively and efficiently; (4) no product quality control standards or monitoring; (5) lack of higher-level support staff to establish and maintain systems to detect and address problems.
Bangladesh Intervention: Counselling of mothers concerning appropriate infant and young child feeding (IYCF). Policy intent: BRAC will integrate IYCF counselling within its existing maternal, newborn and child health (MNCH) programme, with a focus on exclusive breastfeeding for 6 months and appropriate complementary feeding from 6-23 months. Accomplishments: In early 2007, BRAC's research and evaluation division conducted a formative study and convened a stakeholders workshop to develop a strategy for addressing undernutrition through BRAC's programmes. Following this, decisions were made to experiment with integrating counselling for infant feeding in BRAC's MNCH programme. Behaviour change communications (BCC) materials and training plans were developed, and pilot implementation was begun in a few villages in one district in northern Bangladesh. Baseline and endline surveys were done to track progress, and qualitative operations research and programme process documentation/monitoring was undertaken to establish progress and identify key constraints. Pilot activities were then scaled up throughout the district and BCC materials were used in all intervention areas covered by the MNCH programme. BRAC district staff as well as district level Government of Bangladesh staff were oriented to the approach. A national level workshop was held to present this approach to national stakeholders. BRAC is now scaling up its efforts related to IYCF counselling in non-MNCH programme areas as well, to cover one-quarter of the entire country. Capacity constraints: Some constraints identified through the implementation process were: (1) inadequate counselling skills, particularly of low literacy frontline health workers; (2) lack of incentives for sustaining motivation of frontline staff to prioritize IYCF counselling; (3) lack of support staff to problem-solve key issues related to IYCF. These constraints related mainly to workload, skills and supervisory capacity. Some of these constraints are being addressed in scaled-up programming that BRAC is rolling out in 2010.
crucial as countries make greater efforts to achieve alignment on goals, strategies and implementation in the coming years.
The above suggestions for how to resolve disagreements in policy formulation all accept the current institutional architecture and governance system as a given. These consist of ministries, donors, NGOs, coordinating councils and others interacting to promote their preferred problem definitions, interventions and delivery strategies, with no single authority charged with making and enforcing final decisions. When the authority did exist for certain decisions, as in the case of the MOH for decisions on growth monitoring indicators in Bolivia and anaemia interventions in Bangladesh, the competing actors tended to direct their advocacy towards those authorities rather than each other, and authoritative decisions eventually were taken. This suggests the problem is only partly related to the existence of competing interests and perspectives among the policy actors (though these clearly do exist) and the absence of effective fora for reconciling these in a collaborative or deliberative way. It also is related to the absence of effective mechanisms for legitimation as a crucial feature of the policy process (Clark 2002) . This is an aspect that is not explicitly covered by the current concept of 'guiding institutions and governing structures' shown in Table 4 . Future efforts to improve nutrition at country level would benefit from greater clarity on how the legitimation function is to be accomplished, especially in the context of multisectoral strategies. This likely is another issue that will require the involvement of politicians.
Implementation
The application of the Potter and Brough capacity framework (Potter and Brough 2004) in this study revealed that all of the potential implementing institutions have capacity constraints that will limit the reach and effectiveness of interventions. The framework also revealed the important linkages among the nine component capacities in these countries and the need to adopt a systemic view of capacity strengthening, rather than focusing on some capacities and neglecting others. Given the broad implications of this conclusion, the most important insight is the need to strengthen: (a) the individual and institutional operational capacities, for basic programme planning, management, monitoring and evaluation at regional and national levels; and (b) the higher-level leadership and strategic management capacities at national level. Given the largely uncoordinated and fragmented landscape for capacity building in nutrition, some valuable first steps would be to undertake an inventory of current activities in all three regions, seek agreement and resources for a prioritized 10-year strategy, and monitor the implementation of that strategy.
Overall conclusions
This study has systematically applied multiple conceptual and analytical frameworks to better understand the processes of nutrition commitment, agenda setting, policy formulation and implementation in five developing countries. Three overall conclusions are warranted. First, this full spectrum of policy activities, in addition to monitoring, evaluation and programmatic adjustments not addressed here, requires substantial attention if large-scale and sustained reductions in undernutrition are to be achieved. The country experiences documented in this study underscore the inter-connected nature of these policy activities and the need for all of them to be strengthened. Second, within this policy spectrum, high priority is warranted to strengthening strategic capacity (Pelletier 2008) because it is fundamental for advancing commitment-building, agenda setting, policy formulation, capacity-building for operations, and all other aspects of a long-term nutrition agenda at country level. Our conclusions are relevant for the major global initiatives currently under development that seek to reduce undernutrition (Bezanson and Isenman 2010) . We conclude that the extensive investments in intervention efficacy research (Leroy et al. 2007; Rudan et al. 2007b; Bhutta et al. 2008 ) are unlikely to produce sustainable reductions in undernutrition unless or until these constraints in the policy process are better understood and addressed.
